mail authentication coherence audit derived
api.zfinia.comCommunicationsderived
POST https://api.zfinia.com/x402/v1/mail-authentication-coherence-audit
failabsent from every registry#7 by calls of 15 on this host
0.24 USDC
per call, as the listing declares it on eip155:
Compare with anotherEvery figure as JSONCite this page
the price, as of 2026-10-05 14:34 UTC · method
- Validation state
- fail
- Uptime, 7 / 30 / 90 days
- — / 67% / 67%
- Calls, trailing 30 days
- 1
- Unique payers, trailing 30 days
- 1
- Last called
- 2026-10-04 08:40 UTC
- First observed by TOLLderived
- 2026-10-04
- Pricederived
- 0.24 USDC
- Networks
- 1
How big is this endpoint among the ones like it?
No trace is drawn of this endpoint’s own volume. Its counters have changed 1 time across 4 observations, and 3 changes are the fewest this site will draw a trace through, because two points and a guess are not a series. Every observation is in the JSON.
On 2026-10-05 it did not answer at all; TOLL records that as a failure.
At api.zfinia.com, mail authentication coherence audit takes POST requests, is listed in neither registry at the last pull, and falls under communications by TOLL's rules.
mail authentication coherence audit is priced at 0.24 USDC on Base.
Callers of mail authentication coherence audit supply a json body with the fields spf, dmarc, domain, dkim_selectors and sending_subdomains.
mail authentication coherence audit returns json; the example shows domain, limits, passed, policy, coherent, complete and 2 others.
mail authentication coherence audit drew a single call from a single payer in the trailing 30 days.
The last call to mail authentication coherence audit came 9 days before the snapshot, 2026-10-04.
Among the 15 endpoints on api.zfinia.com, mail authentication coherence audit is tied 7th by calls with 9 others.
mail authentication coherence audit takes 4% of the calls counted across api.zfinia.com.
98% of the 934 comparable listings in communications ask less.
mail authentication coherence audit sits nearest in price to pdl people enrich (stableenrich.dev) and tools x timeline (twitr.sh) among listings in communications.
The wallet paid by mail authentication coherence audit is the payee of 179 endpoints across 5 hosts.
The seller's tags on mail authentication coherence audit are email authentication, dmarc, spf and dkim.
mail authentication coherence audit was missing from the Coinbase registry at the pull of 2026-10-06, confirmed at the pull of 2026-10-06; that is registry presence, not liveness.
Where the sentences above compare this endpoint with others, the comparison is against the index as it stands now, live; the figures above are final.
the payment options, as of 2026-10-05 14:34 UTC · method
| registry | network | asset | amount | scheme | pay to |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coinbase | eip155: | USDC | 0.24 USDC | exact | 0x25e824…6a9608 |
the checks, as of 2026-10-05 10:15 UTC · methodendpoint answered HTTP none
endpoint_reachable· the endpoint answered at all
Every sweep that observed this endpoint, newest first.
| observed, UTC | state | failed checks | sweep |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-05 10:15 UTC | fail | 1 | daily-2026-10-05 |
| 2026-10-04 13:14 UTC | pass | 0 | daily-2026-10-04 |
| 2026-10-04 12:43 UTC | pass | 0 | new-after-daily-2026-10-04 |
Presence in a registry, not liveness of the service (method). Newest first.
- absence from Coinbase confirmed, rule v1
- absent from Coinbase at this pull
- listed in Coinbase
From the registry record, not validated by TOLL.the declared schema, as of 2026-10-04 08:40 UTC · method
The input and output block
{
"input": {
"body": {
"spf": "v=spf1 include:_spf.vendor-a.test a mx +all",
"dmarc": "v=DMARC1; p=reject; aspf=s; adkim=s",
"domain": "example.test",
"dkim_selectors": [
{
"record": "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; t=y; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA1234QIDAQAB",
"selector": "rollout2026"
},
{
"record": "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=",
"selector": "retired2024"
}
],
"sending_subdomains": [
"mail.example.test",
"notifications.example.test"
]
},
"type": "http",
"method": "POST",
"bodyType": "json"
},
"output": {
"type": "json",
"example": {
"domain": "example.test",
"limits": {
"maxRecords": 2000,
"maxFindings": 500,
"maxHeaderBytes": 131072,
"maxIncludeTree": 200,
"spfLookupLimit": 10,
"maxRecordLength": 4096,
"spfVoidLookupLimit": 2
},
"passed": false,
"policy": "reject",
"coherent": false,
"complete": true,
"findings": [
{
"code": "REJECT_POLICY_WITH_NO_USABLE_DKIM",
"detail": "The policy is p=reject and no supplied selector carries a usable key outside testing mode. Every message then depends on SPF alignment alone, and the SPF record ends in +all rather than -all. Anything..."
},
{
"code": "ENFORCING_POLICY_WITH_PERMISSIVE_SPF",
"detail": "The policy is p=reject and the SPF record ends in +all, which authorises every host on the internet. SPF then always passes, so the policy enforces nothing through SPF."
},
{
"code": "STRICT_SPF_ALIGNMENT_WITH_SUBDOMAIN_SENDERS",
"detail": "The policy declares aspf=s, so the envelope domain must equal example.test exactly. Mail sent from mail.example.test, notifications.example.test does not align under SPF, and only DKIM can carry it."
}
],
"request_id": "example-request",
"service_id": "mail_authentication_coherence_audit",
"assumptions": [
"Every finding here needs two or three records read together, which is why it exists alongside the single-record audits: no one record is wrong, and the combination does not work.",
"A selector is usable only when it carries a public key and is not in testing mode, because a selector asking receivers to ignore failures cannot contribute to alignment however correctly it signs.",
"Strict alignment is reported against the sending subdomains the caller lists, since that is the only way to know which senders exist. Without the list nothing about subdomain senders is assessed."
],
"limitations": [
"The records supplied. Nothing resolves DNS, no message is evaluated, and what any particular receiver does is outside this. Not a security assessment or a deliverability prediction.",
"coherent is true only when every record was supplied and no combination of them was found to defeat itself."
],
"observed_at": "2026-10-02T00:00:00.000Z",
"not_examined": [],
"finding_count": 6,
"spf_alignment": "s",
"dkim_alignment": "s",
"selector_count": 2,
"service_version": "1.0.0",
"findings_by_code": {
"SUBDOMAIN_MAIL_CANNOT_PASS": 1,
"ENFORCING_WITHOUT_VISIBILITY": 1,
"REJECT_POLICY_WITH_NO_USABLE_DKIM": 1,
"ENFORCING_POLICY_WITH_PERMISSIVE_SPF": 1,
"STRICT_SPF_ALIGNMENT_WITH_SUBDOMAIN_SENDERS": 1,
"STRICT_DKIM_ALIGNMENT_WITH_SUBDOMAIN_SENDERS": 1
},
"subdomain_policy": "reject",
"spf_all_qualifier": "+",
"usable_selector_count": 0,
"sending_subdomain_count": 2
}
}
}Cite this page
This endpoint is delisted: the page is frozen at its last observation and its live URL is the stable one. Data reuse is under CC BY 4.0 (terms).
Plain text
TOLL, "mail authentication coherence audit on api.zfinia.com". https://tollindex.com/e/api-zfinia-com-x402-v1-mail-authentication-coherence-audit-a3026f. Accessed [access date].
BibTeX
@misc{toll-e-api-zfinia-com-x402-v1-mail-authentication-coherence-audit-a3026f-2026-10-13,
author = {TOLL},
title = {mail authentication coherence audit on api.zfinia.com},
howpublished = {\url{https://tollindex.com/e/api-zfinia-com-x402-v1-mail-authentication-coherence-audit-a3026f}},
year = {2026},
month = {10},
note = {Frozen at its last observation, 2026-10-13 14:08 UTC. Accessed [access date].}
}None yet. Anything submitted through the form below is published here with its outcome.